Fiscal Decentralisation, Local Institutions and Public Goods Provision: Evidence from Indonesia * Using data from the Indonesian Family Life Surveys, this paper studies the impact of fiscal decentralisation in Indonesia on local public spending across communities with different types of local institutions. Our results provide evidence of heterogeneity in access to public goods across communities in the period prior to fiscal decentralisation; with significantly greater spending on schools and health centres in communities which observe traditional adat laws (which promote an ethic of mutual cooperation), and less spending on roads, public transport, communications etc. in communities which have a democratic electoral system. Fiscal decentralisation led to an increase in the share of spending on physical infrastructure, as well as a convergence in spending across communities with different types of local institutions. We develop a theoretical model to argue that communities which enjoy a higher level of mutual cooperation would benefit less from investment in public goods which facilitate communication and exchange with outsiders -as these improve the outside options of community members and therefore makes it more difficult to sustain intra-community cooperation. Surprisingly, investment in communications and transport infrastructure in these communities were more restrained during the period of centralised fiscal control.
Introduction
The delivery of public goods and services to poor people remains a signi…cant challenge in many developing countries today (World Bank 2004a). Decentralisation has been identi…ed by many as an important policy reform that has the potential of improving public service delivery. It is a political decision of national leadership that devolves political, …scal and/or administrative powers to local government. It has been argued that …scal decentralisation makes government more responsive and e¢ cient, and that it also strengthens the voice of the poor and the marginalised. However, its success has not been uniform; Bardhan and Mukherjee (2000) highlight the problem of elite capture in a decentralised set up.
Since …scal decentralisation provides greater decision-making power to local governments, its impact on public goods provision should, arguably, depend on the quality and nature of local institutions. The relevant local institutions should not only include the formal processes through which communities make collective decisions regarding public spending, but also the informal institutions which facilitate economic exchange and maintain law and order within the community. These local institutions can vary enormously across and within developing countries, and therefore it is important to understand how they mediate the e¤ects of …scal decentralisation. In this context, we raise the following questions. In a setting where communities enjoy some degree of politcal autonomy, (i) do informal norms and formal institutions in ‡uence the choice of local public goods? And, (ii) how does the introduction of …scal decentralisation impact upon the choice of local public goods?
This paper attempts to bring both theoretical insights and empirical evidence to this under-researched topic. We develop a theoretical model to derive the optimal choice of public goods in communities which rely, in varying degrees, on informal sanctions to maintain cooperation in economic exchange among community members. We argue that public goods which facililate communication and exchange with outsiders (such as roads, public transport, telephone facilities, etc.) will improve the outside options of community members and therefore make it more di¢ cult to sustain intra-community cooperation. Therefore, the greater the existing level of mutual cooperation, ceteris paribus, the less the community should invest in such infrastructure compared to other public goods which do not directly improve communication and trade links with the outside world (such as schools and health centres).
We use data on local public spending in Indonesia from two rounds of the Indonesian Family Life Survey (1997 and 2007) to compare the nature of public investments across communities which vary in terms of the importance of traditional, informal institutions (speci…cally, adat laws) promoting an ethic of mutual cooperation. Fiscal decentralisation laws were introduced in Indonesia in 2001 and, therefore, the two rounds of data also provides an opportunity to study how decentralisation impacted upon public spending in communities with di¤erent types of local institutions. The socially optimal level of spending, derived from our theoretical model, provides a benchmark for comparison.
We take the share of the central government's direct contribution in a community's public spending budget as a measure of centralised …scal control for that community. This share declined, broadly, across Indonesian communities following decentralisation. However, the decentralisation laws introduced a '…scal 2 needs formula'for the transfer of funds from the central government based on geographic and demographic characteristics; such that the central government's share fell by less in coastal, rural, more populous, and geographically larger communities. We exploit this variation to estimate the impact of …scal decentralisation on local public spending across communities with di¤erent types of formal and informal institutions. To ensure that our …ndings are robust, we also estimate the impact of decentralisation on access to public goods, and repeat the analysis with communities which did not experience any institutional change at the local level between 1997 and 2007.
Our results provide evidence of heterogeneity in access to public goods -as well as heterogeneity in investment in di¤erent types of public goods -across communities in the period prior to …scal decentralisation.
There was signi…cantly greater spending on schools and health centres (which we collectively call 'social goods') in communities which observe traditional adat laws (relative to those that do not), and less spending on roads, public transport, communications etc. (which we collectively call 'physical infrastructure') in communities which have a democratic electoral system (relative to those that do not). Moreover, …scal decentralisation led to an increase in the share of spending on physical infrastructure, as well as a convergence in spending across communities with di¤erent types of local institutions.
We …nd that (the share of) spending on physical infrastructure is lower in traditional adat communities, compared to non-adat communities during the period of centralised …scal control, and that this di¤erence disappears in the period following decentralisation. This is contrary to expectations as it suggests that the potential adverse e¤ects of improving links with the outside world for close-knit communities were taken into consideration in local public spending decisions before -but not after -…scal control was devolved to local authorities. We suggest the possibility that community leaders were able to bargain more e¤ectively with the central government and push for policies that would maximise community welfare during the period of centralised …scal control; and that this became more di¢ cult following decentralisation when community members were, at least in some instances, able to vote, secretly and individually, for policies of their choice.
Our results are closely related to, and contribute to, various strands of the literature, including: (i) the literature on democracy and growth which argues that democracy is associated with higher rates of economic growth (e.g. Barro 1996) ; (ii) the political economy literature on public goods provision under di¤erent forms of democracy, including di¤erent methods for apportioning votes, parliamentary versus presidential regimes (Persson and Tabellini, 2004) , and variations in term limits and voter registration rules (Besley and Case, 2003) ; (iii) the political economy of public goods provision in developing countries, which identi…es the role of community leader characteristics on public goods provision, e.g. caste (Pande, 2003) , gender (Du ‡o and Chattopadhyay, 2004) , and the wealth of elected legislators (Besley et al., 2005) ; (iv) a literature on …scal decentralisation and development, which highlights the lack of capacity of local governments (Akin, Hutchinson, and Strump, 2001), misaligned responsibilities arising from incomplete decentralisation (e.g., Devarajan, 2005) and elite capture (Bardhan and Mukherjee, 2000) and (v) an emerging literature on cultures, institution and development (Platteau 2000 ; Guiso et al. 2006) , which highlights the role of social norms and cultural factors in economic development.
We are not aware of any research that explicitly examines the role of institutions, both formal and 3 informal, on public goods provision at the community-level, or the impact of …scal decentralisation across communities with di¤erent types of local institutions. This is an important exercise as access to public goods and infrastructure is understood to be central to economic growth and an important source of heterogeneity in the levels of development across nations and regions. History reveals that informal governance based on personal relations is the precursor to the more formal modes of governance made necessary by everincreasing specialisation and division of labour. Therefore, an understanding of how informal and formal institutions interplay is essential for an understanding of the process of economic development. Our results identify the di¤erential e¤ects of informal and formal institutions on the choice of social goods and physical infrastructure.
The paper is developed as follows. In 2, we provide an overview of central government policy in Indonesia in its dealings with local communities; to provide the context for our theoretical and empirical analysis. In Section 3.1, we discuss the theoretical literature which provides a starting point for our model on local public goods expenditures. The model is presented in sections 3.2 to 3.6, and its implications for …scal decentralisation are discussed in Section 3.7. Section 4 provides a description of the data and the econometric speci…cations used in our analysis. The econometric results are discussed in section 5, and we consider possible explanations to account for the results in Section 5.3. Our conclusions are presented in section 6.
Background on the Soeharto Regime and Fiscal Decentralisation in Indonesia
At the start of the process of …scal decentralisation in 2001, Indonesia was characterised by substantial heterogeneity in its local institutions. We provide a brief description of Soeharto's New Order regime, which lasted from 1966 to 1998, to explain the nature and source of this heterogeneity. This background will motivate the theoretical model in Section 3 as well as help interpret our empirical …ndings in Section 4.
During the New Order Period, Soeharto established a strongly unitary state and acted to enforce territorial claims over much of Indonesia. Rejecting Sukarno's socialist legacy, Soeharto made a U-turn on economic policy, embracing an unfettered capitalism. He supported national entrepreneurship to build big businesses, which in turn led to rapid development of urban centres. A clear distinction was made between rural and urban communities through the Village Law of 1979. While leaders of rural communities were elected or nominated by local people, urban community leaders were to be appointed by the central government.
The New Order regime was dedicated to maintaining political order, promoting economic development, and excluding mass participation from the political process. The military had a strong role in politics and the regime opted for a selective but e¤ective and sometimes brutal repression against its opponents, most notably the communists. A number of seats in the Parliament were set aside for the military under the dwifungsi (dual function) doctrine. Thus, Soeharto made way to a dictatorial government, backed by the army and a co-opted elite. The armed services took over much of the economy, with senior o¢ cers often getting the government contracts, property deals and nationalised industries. Very often this involved ownership or a cut of pro…ts rather than direct management.
4
The regime placed clear emphasis on Indonesian identity over regional/ethnic identity, which threatened many ethnic groups including the adat communities (which observed and practised their own local customary laws and traditions). In order to bring the adat communities under central government, there have been signi…cant changes in property rights in land and other natural resources. Even though the state did not formally own all of the free land, the notion of state-controlled land was emphasized during this period.
The state resumed exclusive authority over all territories classi…ed as forest area including all aspects of human activities within them. Local customary institutions were marginalised, replaced or co-opted through centrally-driven and capital-intensive development policies. These policies served the political and economic interests of the national elite, the regional and local agents they patronised, and the international agencies and investors who supported them. These changes came as a threat to the traditional adat communities who had lived o¤ the land and its natural resources for generations and had preserved their autonomous cultures, including aspects of language, belief, production patterns, law and social institutions till this period.
It is possible that the Soeharto government also pursued a more subtle strategy for promoting national integration by investing heavily in education. Greater access to education would be welcome in all communities; but a nationally integrated education system could also be designed to reinforce the Indonesian identity rather than the varied ethnic and religious identities of its people. In 1974, the Indonesian government initi- were low, doubling the number of available schools per capita. As much as 12% of the regional development budget was devoted to school construction (as opposed to only 3.4% on regional health); this increased spending was largely funded by an unprecedented increase in oil revenue during this period.
By the 1990s, cracks were appearing on the façade of the New Order regime as it underwent signi…cant transformation itself. This involved a shift from a military regime to a personalistic/autocratic regime as Soeharto, having outlived all other competitors of his generation, emerged as the unrivalled strongman (Hill and Shiraisi, 2007) . Army o¢ cers who had served as his personal con…dants dominated the military (Shiraishi, 1999a). His family members, now grown up and each intent on building his or her own business empire, relied on presidential powers to obtain business opportunities and privileges.
While adat laws were formally banned during Soeharto's regime, the formal ban did not result in their abandonment everywhere. The geography of the country makes it particularly di¢ cult for the central administration to reach the remote islands. Many communities protested against central intervention especially in the 1990s. Secret wars went on in East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya (Schwarz, 1999; McGibbon, 2004 In summary, a number of factors in Indonesia's social, political and economic transformation during, and immediately following, Soeharto's new order regime, are salient for our analysis.
1. The regime had aggressively pursued a policy of centralised …scal control up until its end. It also maintained control over local urban politics, but rural communities were allowed to choose their own leaders.
2. The central government aimed to undermine traditional adat communities -which had their own autonomous local institutions for mediating social and economic matters -through changes in property rights for land and natural resources. There is evidence that, at least since the 1990's, this process was resisted in the more remote provinces. 3 Theoretical Model
Related Literature
One of the ways in which a group can ensure that its members adhere to a set of prescribed rules in social and economic interactions is by excluding those who violate them, at least temporarily, from the bene…ts of group membership. This reasoning plays an important role in theoretical explanations of the functioning of informal insurance groups (Kimball 1988 , Fafchamps 1992 , Coate and Ravallion 1994 ; in which members of the group comply with the rules of mutual insurance because they value the bene…ts of being part of the group, and the extent of mutual insurance in turn depends on the extent to which this insurance is valued by its members.
Similar mechanisms have been proposed to explain the e¤ectiveness of joint liability credit contracts in eliciting high repayment rates (Besley and Coate 1995) , and contract enforcement in the context of medieval trade (Greif 1993 ). According to this kind of reasoning, the extent to which a group can enforce its rules of behaviour is a¤ected by the bene…ts of group membership, which in turn depends on the outside options that its members have. Consequently, as the outside options of the members improve, the ability of the group to enforce its rules declines. Kranton (1996) develops a theoretical model of 'reciprocal exchange'(i.e.
goods or services are given in exchange for future compensation in kind) where this mechanism is in e¤ect:
as markets develop, individuals have more opportunity to engage in trade outside of informal, personalised exchange; the cost of social exclusion thus declines, which in turn makes it more di¢ cult to sustain honest behaviour in reciprocal exchange.
Similary, Platteau (2006) has argued that social norms of informal insurance and communal land rights in traditional village communities become less e¤ective as market integration provides outside opportunities to a rural population. Ho¤ and Sen (2005) explore the consequences of this type of tension between informal, personalised exchange and market-based exchange in the context of a kin system. They argue that the tension provides a kin group the incentives to take collective action to restrict its members from migrating to the modern sector even if doing so might raise aggregate welfare. Thus, the kin group can lead to a kind of poverty trap. In the context of informal insurance, Wahhaj (2010) argues that the insuring group will …nd it in its interest to prescribe behaviour that restrict the ability of its members to self-insure (such as a prescription of excessive consumption) as this increases the value of the service provided by the insuring group and makes it easier to enforce the rules of mutual insurance using a threat of social exclusion from the group. The theoretical contribution of the present paper is to extend the reasoning highlighted above to the context of local public expenditures. Just as a kin group may wish to engage in collective action which limits the outside options of its members, a community may choose, collectively, to restrict the type of public investments that would enable its members to engage better with the outside economy. Moreover, these incentives should be stronger in communities that have more intra-community exchange to protect.
If such incentives are present, they should have implications for -and be apparent in -a process of …scal decentralisation. We explore these ideas formally in sections 3.2 to 3.7.
It should be noted that there is an existing theoretical literature on collective action and and the provision of public services, reviewed, for example, by Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan (2007) . This literature relates di¤erent characteristics of a group -including group size, the distribution of bene…ts and cohesion within the group to the level of public goods provision, compared to the …rst-best level. Our approach is closest to that of Miguel and Gugerty (2004) , who argue that a group with stronger social networks has greater ability to impose sanctions on group members who free-ride; and therefore should be able to generate a higher level of public goods. However, unlike this literature, we distinguish between public goods which support interactions within communities and across communities, and relate group solidarity to the type of public good provided.
Setup
Imagine a community consisting of N members labelled 1; 2; ::; N . In each period, members of the community face a choice of engaging in trade with a fellow community member or with an outsider. In the present context, 'trade'should be interpreted broadly to include any bilateral exchange which can provide utility to both sides. Trade with an outsider generates a payo¤ of V o . Intra-community trade can potentially generate a payo¤ of V c for each party. Given the presence of formal institutions which can enforce contracts in the modern economy, the speci…ed gains from inter-community trade are guaranteed.
Intra-community trade, however, must be supported by the threat of community sanctions, and therefore we model the strategic interaction between trading parties in more detail. Speci…cally, if two community members opt to trade with each other, then they must simultaneously choose between the actions 'Trade'
(honestly) and 'Cheat'. The fraction 1 represents the loss in surplus when either or both parties opt to 'Cheat'. When only one party opts to 'Cheat'and the other party opts to 'Trade'honestly, there is also a transfer of resources from the latter to the former equal to a payo¤ of V c . The payo¤s are summarised in Table 1 below:
where ; 2 (0; 1). If + > 1, then the simultaneous-move game has a unique Nash equilibrium (Cheat, Cheat) for any V c > 0. We assume henceforth that this inequality holds.
We distinguish between two kinds of infrastructure which may strengthen the scope of either intercommunity or intra-community trade. Investment in roads and communications technology will facilitate exchange between the community and the outside world. The development of public spaces within the community will facilitate social interactions within the community. Schools and health centres will, over time, improve the level of education and health within the community, and, arguably, provide more scope for mutually bene…cial exchange within the community. In summary, 'physical'infrastructure (roads, communications network) is relatively more important for inter-community trade and 'social'infrastructure (schools, health centres, community centres) are relatively more important for intra-community trade.
To capture these ideas within the model, we represent the intra-community and inter-community gains from trade as follows:
where K s denotes social infrastructure within the community and K p denotes physical infrastructure. We To sustain cooperation in intra-community trade, anyone who cheats must be subject to some kind of punishment by the community. We assume that this punishment takes the form of exclusion from intracommunity trade for a certain number of periods. During the period of social exclusion, the individual would still be able to engage in trade with outsiders. Therefore, the severity of the punishment depends on the value of intra-community trade over inter-community trade, which is itself a function of the punishment imposed by the community. Therefore, we represent the punishment as a function P (K s ; K p ) which will be derived endogenously from the model in subsequent sections. We assume that the community also has the means to impose additional social sanctions proportional to the value of intra-community trade,
[the factor will be used primarily for comparative statics exercises later on]. Then, cooperation can be sustained in intra-community trade if and only if the following condition holds:
where is the discount factor for future utility.
Choice of Trading Partner
In sections 3.3 to 3.6, we determine the optimal choice of investment in social and physical infrastructure across di¤erent types of communities. Combining (3) and (1), we obtain c ( 1)
Let us denote by^ c the value of c at each (4) is satis…ed with equality. Then, for c <^ c , cooperation can be sustained in intra-community trade. Then, a community member will opt for intra-community trade over inter-community trade if and only if V c V o . For c >^ c , cooperation cannot be sustained in intracommunity trade. Therefore, a community member will opt for intra-community trade over inter-community trade if and only if V c V o . Figure 1 shows the possible values that c and o can take in a particular period and the type of trade -inter-community or intra-community -that will occur for each combination of values. Although the visual representation is simple and intuitive, the mathematical representation of expected utility for general distribution functions is unwieldy. Therefore, we make further assumptions about the distributions as follows:
; F c ( ) = 0 for < and F c ( ) = 1 for > and
Assumption 1 says that c is uniformly distributed in the interval ; and has an average value of 1.
Assumption 2 says that o always takes a value of 1. These assumptions are made for analytical convenience and the main insights from the model, as will be seen, do not hinge on them.
Wc . Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there are four possible outcomes, depending on the realised value of c , as described below:
1. For c 2 ( ; ), we obtain inter-community trade; 2. For c 2 ;^ c , we obtain intra-community cooperative trade; 3. For c 2 ^ c ; , we obtain, once again, inter-community trade; 4. For c 2 ; , we obtain intra-community non-cooperative trade.
The …rst outcome describes the situation where the value of c is su¢ ciently low for cooperation to be sustained in intra-community trade; but since trade with outsiders is relatively more attractive, community members opt for the latter. As c increases, community members will begin to …nd intra-community trade more attractive and therefore may switch to this option. This is the second outcome described above.
However, when c crosses the threshold^ c , the temptation to cheat in intra-community trade is too strong: therefore, cooperation cannot be sustained and members of the community will again prefer trading with outsiders (third outcome). But for a su¢ ciently high value of c , community members will prefer intracommunity trade to inter-community trade even if cooperation cannot be sustained (fourth outcome).
It should be noted that if < , then the …rst type of outcome cannot occur. Similarly, if >^ c , or <^ c or > , then, correspondingly, the second, third or fourth type of outcome is not feasible.
For the subsequent analysis, we assume that < <^ c < < , which means that each of the four outcomes described above occurs for some range of values of c . Then, for each community member, we can write the expected utility from trade as follows:
The Cost of Social Exclusion in Equilibrium
If an individual is prevented from trading with other community members, she would receive a utility of W o in each period from trade with outsiders. Therefore, the loss in utility per period from such an embargo is obtained by subtracting W o from the expression in (5), as shown below:
If the punishment imposed on individuals who cheat in intra-community trade is an embargo of T periods, then we have
Note that it is possible to adjust T , weighing the advantages of increasing severity of punishment against the social cost of exclusion, so as to maximise the expected utility of community members. However, for the present analysis, we regard it as an exogenous parameter determined by custom. This may be justi…ed if long-term social exclusion is not regarded as practical for (economic) reasons not explicitly introduced into the model.
How Cooperation is A¤ected by the Relative Gains from Inter-Community versus Intra-Community Trade
Recall that^ c = (
1)
h P (Ks;Kp) Wc(Ks) + i . Using (6) and (7) and the de…nition of^ c , and
Rearranging and simplifying terms, we obtain
Equation (8) may have zero, one or two solutions. By construction,^ c 2 ; . Therefore, we need only consider solutions in this interval. If there are two solutions in this interval, we consider the one corresponding to a higher value of^ c as it is pareto-superior to the other. 
How Investment in Infrastructure A¤ects the Utility from Trade
Investment in physical infrastructure leads to an increase in K p and consequently in the gains from trade with outsiders, W o . This leads to a direct increase in the expected utility in trade, as seen in (5), but also a decrease in the relative value of intra-community trade which, using Lemma 1, makes cooperation in intra-community trade more di¢ cult to sustain; i.e. it leads to a decrease in^ c . This negatively a¤ects the expected utility from trade.
Investment in social infrastructure leads to an increase in K s and consequently in the gains from intracommunity trade, W c . This leads to a direct increase in the expected utility in trade, as seen in (5), but also an increase in the relative value of intra-community trade which, using Lemma 1, makes cooperation in intra-community trade easier to sustain; i.e. it leads to an increase in^ c . This positively a¤ects the expected utility from trade.
Formally, di¤erentiating throughout (5) with respect to K p and simplifying terms, we obtain
Di¤erentiating throughout (5) with respect to K s , we obtain
The …rst term in (9) and (10) represent the direct e¤ects of investment on the expected gains from trade;
while the second term represent the indirect e¤ects. When^ c > , the expression^ c W c W o is positive and increasing in the level of cooperation in intra-community trade, and therefore the magnitude of the indirect e¤ect in both (9) and (10) is higher in communities with higher levels of cooperation.
For …xed levels of K s and K p , higher translates into greater cooperation in intra-community trade,
i.e. higher^ c (Lemma 1). From (9) and (10), it is evident that both the direct and indirect e¤ects of an investment in social infrastructure are increasing in^ c while the direct and indirect e¤ects of an investment in physical infrastructure are decreasing (in the case of the indirect e¤ect, becoming more negative) in^ c .
Thus, we obtain the following result. satis…ed, communities which exhibit higher levels of intra-community cooperation (greater and^ c ) also have a stronger preference for investments in social infrastructure compared to physical infrastructure.
The Impact of Fiscal Decentralisation
Let us denote by U (K p ; K s ; ) the expected utility from trade for an individual in a community where the level of physical and social infrastructure are given by K p and K s respectively and , as discussed in Section 3.3, represents the scope of community sanctions.
It is important to realise that the objective of the relevant authorities -the central government, the local elite or democratically elected leaders -in allocating public spending, may have included goals not captured by the term U (K p ; K s ; ). As discussed in Section 2, the Soeharto administration pursued a policy of national unity and industrialisation and therefore the central government may have preferred investment choices that would accelerate economic and social integration of isolated communities. The local elite may have preferred certain types of investment for which the pro…ts were easier to capture.
To capture other objectives that may be pursued by the relevant authorities in determining the allocation of public spending, we introduce a distinct function (K p ; K s ) which is continuous and di¤erentiable in both arguments; and assume that investment decisions were obtained from maximising a weighted average of U (K p ; K s ; ) and (K p ; K s ) as below:
The e¤ects of …scal decentralisation on decisions regarding local public spending can, then, be treated as a shift in . We denote by K p ( ; ; Y ) ; K s ( ; ; Y ) the solution to the maximisation problem in (11) and by the expression 
The …rst part of Proposition 2 implies that, holding …xed the role of di¤erent agents -the central government, the local elite, and the village electorate -in the allocation of public funds within the community, the optimal level of investment (as de…ned in (11)) in social instructure should be higher -and in physical infrastructure lower -in communities characterised by higher levels of cooperation.
The expression , in the second part of Proposition 2, measures the change in U (:) when a small quantity of funds are transferred from physical infrastructural investments to social infrastructural investments, minus the corresponding changes in (:). If the expression is positive for all values of K p and K s , it means, roughly, that the relative importance of social infrastructure over physical infrastructure is greater for the bene…ts of trade compared to whatever policy objective is represented by the function (:).
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The second part of Proposition 2 states that if this condition holds true, then at a higher value of , the level of physical infrastructure would be higher, and the level of social infrastructure lower, in the 'optimal' allocation of public funds.
As we have not speci…ed the function (:), we cannot say whether and when the conditions in Proposition 2(ii) will hold true. However, using the reasoning in the proof of Proposition 1, we can show that, for …xed values of K s and K p , we have U s U p increasing in .
Therefore, the function (:) is more likely to be positive in communities characterised by higher levels of cooperation. It follows that in communities with higher levels of cooperation, increasing would decrease the allocation of public funds to social infrastructure in the solution to (11) ; while in communities with lower levels of cooperation, increasing would have the opposite e¤ect. We can state this result formally as a corollory to Propositon 2:
We can use the corollary to determine whether …scal decentralisation resulted in an increase or decrease in . Suppose that, in communities characterised by high levels of cooperation, …scal decentralisation is more frequently associated with a shift in local public spending towards social infrastructure and away from physical infrastructure. If so, then, according to the corollary to Proposition 2, the process of decentralisation would be consistent with a decrease in ; i.e. with more emphasis being placed on the expected utility from trade. By contrast, if …scal decentralisation is more frequently associated with a shift towards physical infrastructural spending in communities characterised by high levels of cooperation, then the process would be consistent with an increase in .
Data and Methodology
The analysis is based on community-level data obtained from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS).
In addition to household level data akin to that in the Living Standards Measurement Surveys, the IFLS provides detailed information on communities. Each round of the IFLS contains information on 314 rural and urban communities drawn from 13 provinces including Jakarta, Bali, Java (central, east and south), (v) ) selected the local leader, and so we exclude these communities from our analysis. Accordingly, we classify the local polity as 'democratic'if a leader is selected by free and fair elections with all community members having the right to vote, and 'oligarchic' if a leader is selected by community elites (codes (iii) and (iv)), who then remain uncontested. We assume that the incidence of oligarchies re ‡ects the scope for elite capture. Using this data, we de…ne a binary variable ELITE which takes a value of 1 for 'oligarchic'communities and 0 for 'democratic'communities.
Using this classi…cation, Table 1 The IFLS data also provides information on the extent to which community members participate in mutual cooperation groups. In 1997, a signi…cantly higher proportion of individuals participated in such groups in adat communities than in non-adat communities (see Table 2b ). But there is a sharp rise in mutual cooperation activities in both types of communities in 2007, and the di¤erences in the rates of participation are no longer statistically signi…cant. As the classi…cation based on adat laws are more stable across the two years than the classi…cation based on mutual cooperation activities, we regard it as a more reliable measure of underlying informal institutions at the community-level. The 1997 data indicates that the adat communities tend to practise a signi…cantly higher level of mutual cooperation, and we adopt this interpretation to interpret our empirical …ndings. We de…ne a binary variable ADAT which takes a value of 1 for communities where adat laws 'are almost never broken'and 0 otherwise.
Physical Infrastructural Goods:
The aim of the paper is to examine how local institutions shape the provision of di¤erent types of public goods. Therefore, we focus on a number of basic infrastructural goods that could directly impact on sustainable livelihoods and provide opportunities for all, especially for the poor. The list of 'physical'infrastructural goods we consider includes the community's access to cemented local roads , access to motorised public transport including buses and boats, access to a public telephone o¢ ce, and access to a post o¢ ce. Local roads and motorised public transport can subtantially reduce the disadvantages associated with geographical isolation and remoteness and are, therefore, potentially important tools for economic development and poverty alleviation. Similarly, the availability of public telephone services and post o¢ ces could substantially reduce the disadvantages associated with location and distance. Using principal components methods, we generate a composite infrastructural goods index consisting of the aforementioned physical infrastructural goods (labelled PCINFRA).
Social Goods: We compare these physical infrastructural goods with a community's access to two important 'social'goods: namely, the number of government schools and health centres per capita. Table 3 compares adat and non-adat communities in terms of their access to these public goods. It is evident that the adat communities have worse access to 'physical'infrastructural goods but better access to government schools and health centres.
In general, the …scal decentralisation in Indonesia did not, in fact, decentralise the system of revenues.
Rather, the key change was a shift in the centre of power from the central government in Jakarta to the district governments located in the district headquarters. Fiscal decentralisation, as contained in Law 25/99, gave communities absolute freedom on how to spend public funds received from the district headquarters, The IFLS data provides details of the community budget and we use this information to calculate the allocation of public spending between new social and physical infrastructural goods. Accordingly, we classify community level spending as follows: (i) spending on social development, which includes spending on education, health, community services and women's development and (ii) spending on village enterprises and physical infrastructural goods. The remainder of community public budget goes to the maintenance of local infrastructure, the payment of salaries and other administrative expenses. We construct variables SHSOC and SHINFRA de…ned, respectively, as the proportion of total development spending on social infrastructure, and the proportion of total development spending on physical infrastructure. Table 4 provides summary statistics on the source of revenues and share of spending on di¤erent types of public goods in 1997 and 2007. It is evident that the share of the funds received directly from the central government fell sharply following decentralisation; however, this decline was accompanied by an increase in the share of the funds received from the district-level governments. Furthermore, there was a signi…cant increase in the share of community spending on 'physical'infrastructural goods in the post-decentralisation period when local governments were given full freedom to spend according to their needs.
Methodology
We exploit changes in the share of the grant from the central government in the community budget before and after the introduction of …scal decentralisation to identify the causal e¤ects of …scal autonomy, and informal and formal institutions, on the provision of public goods. Our identi…cation strategy is described below.
Let y it be the share of the public good y in the total expenditures budget of community i in period t;
and let X it be a vector of characteristics of community i in period t. Let R it be a measure of the extent to which spending is determined by local authorities versus central government authorities in community i in period t (with larger numbers indicating a greater say for local authorities) .
We propose the following relationship:
where E(u it jX it ; R it ) = 0, V ar(u it jX it ; R it ) = 2 . In general, …scal decentralisation shifted R it in favour of local authorities. However, the extent of the shift may be correlated to the initial conditions in the community. Morever, certain community characteristics, particularly local institutions, may themselves have been a¤ected by the process of …scal decentralisation (besides other exogenous factors). Therefore, we proceed by estimating the following equation with R it as the dependent variable:
where D t is a binary variable which takes a value of 1 in year 2007 and 0 otherwise; and Z i is a set of time-invariant community-level characteristics. Equation (13) allows for the e¤ect of these time-invariant community characteristics on R it to change over time. This assumption seems plausible as the …scal decentralisation laws, introduced in 2001, changed the balance between the local government and the central government in local public spending decisions. Using our estimates for (13), we can compute,R it , predicted values for R it . We can replace R it with its predicted values in (12) and estimate the resulting equation with community …xed-e¤ects.
Variables in Z i can, of course, directly in ‡uence y it . But there is no a priori reason to assume that the direct in ‡uence of Z i on y it changes from one period to the next. Equation (12) implicitly assumes that the direct in ‡uence of any time-invariant community characteristics on y it is constant over time. Under this assumption, the direct in ‡uence of Z i on R it will be absorbed in community …xed-e¤ects and any time-variation inR it can be attributed to the …scal decentralisation process. Therefore, it constitutes our identifying assumption for determining the e¤ect of R it on y it .
In practice, we measure R it using the share of the grant from the central government in the community's public spending budget. We take a larger share to indicate that the central government had greater in ‡uence in local spending decisions. We select variables for Z i using the '…scal rule formula'discussed in the preceding section as a guide: Z includes the population and geographic size of the community, its distance from the district headquarters, the proportion of households in the community that are poor, and binary variables to indicate whether the community is rural and has access to sea, and whether Islam is the main religion. (The population and the poverty rate, of course, do change over time but these changes account for only a small part of the total variation inR it ). We use district …xed-e¤ects to estimate (13) , as the '…scal rule formula' was applied at the level of the district.
We estimate equation (12) 
We also compare the IV estimates of (14) with the un-instrumented estimates (15) below
We estimate equations (14) and (15) with community …xed-e¤ects c i to absorb the direct e¤ect of timeinvariant community characteristics.
According to the theoretical results discussed in Section 3.7, the sign of the coe¢ cient CGA should indicate whether …scal decentralisation led to a change in the weight assigned to expected gains from withinand between-community trade for community members in determining the allocation of local public expenditures. If the coe¢ cient is negative when y is the share of social investments in the community budget, this means that an increase inR it corresponds to a decrease in as de…ned in Section 3.7. In other words, …scal decentralisation led to increased emphasis on gains from trade for community members in public spending decisions. If the coe¢ cient is positive, then …scal decentralisation shifted emphasis from the gains from trade for community members to other social, economic or political objectives.
Empirical Results and Analysis
In this section, we present and analyse our results. We start with the un-instrumented estimates of equation (15) as shown in Appendix Table A1 . However, given the potential endogeneity of the share of the central grant as a measure of R, we focus our analysis on the instrumented estimates of equation (14) . These estimates are shown in Tables 5, 6 and 7: while Table 5 shows the …rst stage estimates of share of central grant, Tables 6 and 7 In order to obtain the instrumented estimates of public goods provision, we start with the district-level FE-OLS estimates of equation (13). We include not only the set of variables Z (see section 4.2), but also a set of interaction terms between a year-dummy variable (which takes a value of 1 for the year 2007 and 0 otherwise) and variables in Z. As indicated above, the choice of explanatory variables has been dictated by the '…scal rule formula' introduced at the time of …scal decentralisation in 2001. These estimates are clustered at the district-level to minimise the problem of correlation over time for a given district (see Table   5 ). We particularly focus our attention on the interaction terms which represent the di¤erential e¤ects of …scal decentralisation. In general, there is evidence of a signi…cant di¤erential e¤ect of the population, geographical size, and location of the community (i.e. whether or not it is rural and has access to sea and its distance from the district headquarters). The estimates indicate that, while the share of the grant from the central government in the community public spending budget fell across communities on average in 2007, the decline was more muted in coastal, rural, more populous, and geographically larger communities. We use these estimates to calculate …tted values for the share of the central government grant. These values are then used as the relevant community-level instrument for the estimation of public goods provision, as laid out in equation (12). Table 6 reports the estimated coe¢ cients from the second-stage regressions involving the share of physical and social investments in the community budget. In each case, the Davidson-McKinnon test rejects the null hypothesis suggesting that the panel IV estimates are meaningful. In the case of physical investments (column 1), the coe¢ cient of the share of the central government grant in the community budget is negative and signi…cant. Thus, as the central government's share in the community budget increases, spending on physical infrastructure goes down. Given the signs of the coe¢ cients on the interaction terms, this negative e¤ect is even stronger for adat communities but more muted for 'elite'communities (both are statistically signi…cant). For the share of social spending (column 2), the central government's share in the community budget does not signi…cantly a¤ect spending on social goods. However, there is potentially a positive e¤ect on adat communities (though statistically insigni…cant) and a negative e¤ect on 'elite'communities. 1 The corresponding …rst stage estimates are shown in Appendix Table A4 .
Estimates of Shares of Public Spending
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These results indicate that the process of decentralisation -which led to a decline in central government's contributions to local budgets -led to a sharp rise in the share of community spending on physical infrastructural investments. Furthermore, this e¤ect was stronger for adat communities and weaker for 'elite'
communities. This implies that the central government constrained infrastructural spending across all communities; but to a greater extent in adat communities than in non-adat communities; and to a lesser extent in 'elite'communities than in 'non-elite'communities.
By contrast, …scal decentralisation did not lead to a signi…cant change in the share of community budgets devoted to social spending. Table 7 reports the estimates from the second-stage regressions involving the existing level of public goods provision. As with public spending shares, in these cases too, the Davidson-McKinnon test rejects the null hypothesis suggesting that the panel IV estimates are meaningful.
Estimates of Public Infrastructural Goods
Recall that the dependent variable PCINFRA (column 1) is a composite index comprising of binary variables indicating the presence of concrete roads, access to bus services, post o¢ ce facilities, and a public telephone o¢ ce in the community. As such, it is a measure of physical infrastructure which facilitate communication and exchange with individuals outside of the community; and it can be regarded as the 'stock' variable corresponding to the measure of investment in physical infrastructure considered in the previous section.
The coe¢ cient for the variable ELITE is negative and statistically signi…cant while that of ADAT is close to zero; therefore, the level of physical infrastructure is lower in communities where the process of selecting leaders is non-democratic; but there is little di¤erence between adat and non-adat communities.
The coe¢ cient of the share of the central government's grant in the community budget is negative and statistically signi…cant; therefore, an increased role of the central government in budget decisions is associated with lower levels of physical infrastructure.
However, the corresponding interaction term with the variable ELITE is positive, statistically signi…cant, and of the same order of magnitude as the uninteracted term. Thus, where local institutions favour the elite, changing the share of the central government in the budget has no impact on the stock of physical infrastructure; the objectives of the central government are in line with those of the elite. The coe¢ cient for the interaction term with the variable ADAT is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero; this suggest that the central government did not pursue di¤erential policies in adat versus non-adat communities.
We also consider how the share of the central government's grant in the local budget in ‡uences the number of government schools and health centres per capita (columns 2 and 3 of Table 7 ). These can be regarded as the 'stock'variable corresponding to the measure of investment in social infrastructure considered in the previous section. The central government appears to have a strongly positive e¤ect on the stock of schools but a negative e¤ect on health centres.
In adat communities, a greater role of the central government is associated with more schools and more health centres (both e¤ects are statistically signi…cant). But in the 'elite' communities, a greater role of 20 the central government is associated with fewer schools and health centres (albeit the second e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant).
By contrast, we do not observe any signi…cant di¤erences between adat and non-adat communities and 'elite'and 'non-elite'communities in terms of the stock of social infrastructure, when the central government is absent.
In summary, the estimates with the stock variables are very similar to those with the investment share variables. The di¤erence between communities with di¤erent local institutions is not that they exhibit di¤erent preferences in public goods spending -with the exception that 'elite'communities appear to care less about investment in physical infrastructure and have lower levels of infrastructure -but rather that the central government, when and where it had a role in these decisions, pursued di¤erent policies in communities with varying local institutions. The central government is investing less in the physical infrastructure of adat communities, and there are indications that they are investing more in the social infrastructure of these communities. Moreover, the central goverment is o¤seting the tendency of 'elite'communities to spend less on physical infrastructure, and supressing spending on social infrastructure in these communities. In the next section, we consider possible explanations for these results.
Possible Explanations
East Asian Financial Crisis
The …rst explanation we need to consider is that public spending between the two rounds of the survey, 1997
and 2007, was a¤ected by the East Asian …nancial crisis. The crisis in ‡icted a major blow to infrastructural investment; transport and communication output contracted by 36.44% and 15.13% respectively; road conditions deteriorated signi…cantly due to the lack of maintenance funds and this reduction was more dramatic in rural areas (World Bank 2004b).
The crisis would have suppressed spending on both physical infrastructure and social infrastrcuture at the start of the crisis in 1997. And the recovery in spending would have occurred during the same period that …scal spending was being decentralised. Therefore, we would expect the data to show a negative correlation between the share of central government funds in the community budget and spending on infrastructure.
Indeed, in the estimation results we observe a negative e¤ect of centralisation on spending in physical infrastructure. However two other factors in the results indicate that this cannot be explained entirely by the East Asian …nancial crisis. The …rst is that we observe similar e¤ects not only for annual spending but also for the corresponding stock variables across communities. While spending in 1997 would have been adversely a¤ected by the …nancial crisis -which began in the same year -it seems implausible that the stock of physical infrastructure in those communities would have su¤ered and declined to the same extent at the very start of the crisis. Second, while we observe a negative e¤ect of …scal centralisation on physical infrastructure spending, we do not observe a similar e¤ect for spending on schools and health centres. This suggests that the positive e¤ect of …scal decentralisation on physical infrastructure spending in communities we observe in the data goes beyond the simple correlation between the process of decentralisation and recovery from the East Asian …nancial crisis.
Urban Bias
The second possibility that needs to be considered is urban bias in development policies pursued by the Soeharto regime in Indonesia ..The 1979 village laws laid down by Soeharto made a.clear distinction between rural and urban areas with, for example, di¤erential rules for the selection of leaders in rural and urban communities. Soeharto supported national entrepreneurship to build big businesses, which in turn led to the rapid development of urban centres (Hill and Shiraishi 2007). It can also be argued that Soeharto's power base was concentrated in urban areas and, therefore, the central government had clear incentives to invest more heavily in these areas.
It is evident from Table 1 and Table 2 that the 'elite'communities identi…ed in our data are more likely to be urban; while the adat communities are more likely to be rural. Urban bias would translate into higher spending in 'elite' communities and lower spending in the adat communities; and if the process of …scal decentralisation reduced urban bias, decentralisation would be associated with increased spending in adat communities and decreased spending in 'elite'communities.
We noted earlier that the central government constrained infrastructural spending to a greater extent in adat communities than in non-adat communities; and to a lesser extent in 'elite' communities than in 'non-elite'communities. This would be consistent with a policy of urban bias in the development of physical infrastructure. However, in the case of social infrastructure (schools and hospitals), the regressions involving stock levels indicate that the central government invested more heavily in adat communities and less in the 'elite'communities; a phenomenon that cannot be explained by the notion of urban bias alone.
Decentralisation and Community Norms
One of the aims of this paper is to study how …scal decentralisation a¤ected communities which practised traditional norms of solidarity, compared to those where such norms are weak or absent. For this purpose we distinguished, as described earlier, between adat and non-adat communities in the data; and analysed, within a theoretical model, the socially optimal investment choice as a function of the existing level of mutual cooperation in the community.
The estimated coe¢ cients of the interaction term involving the binary variable ADAT and the share of the central government's grant in the community budget, in Table 7 , indicate that the central government made di¤erential choices across adat and non-adat communities. Speci…cally, the coe¢ cients imply that, in adat communities, …scal centralisation was associated with greater investment in social infrastructure (i.e. schools and health centres) and less investment in physical infrastructure, compared to non-adat communities. (The estimated coe¢ cients for the interaction term 'adat x shcg_iv_distfe'for the investment shares regressions in Table 6 , although statistically insigni…cant, are consistent with this interpretation). According to the theoretical discussion in Section 3.7, these estimates imply that …scal decentralisation led to an increase in ; i.e. greater weight being placed on factors other than the e¤ects of investments on intra-community trade,
as represented by the function U (K p ; K s ; ). It is possible that the government pursued a more subtle strategy for promoting national integration by investing heavily in education. Greater access to education would be welcome in all communities but it could also be designed to reinforce the Indonesian identity -rather than the varied ethnic and religious identities -of school students. Du ‡o (2001) highlights the importance of the very large school construction projects initiated in 1973 with a view to boost school enrolment and thus redress regional inequality across the country. This was particularly evident in the second …ve-year plan that saw as much as 12% of the regional development budget being spent on school construction (as opposed to only 3.4% of the regional development budget on public health). Indeed, in Table 7 , we see that centralised …scal control is associated with more schools per capita at the expense of medical centres.
We argue that the investment choices during the period of centralised …scal control were closer to the 'optimal'levels (de…ned in terms of an objective of maximising the gains of trade, as represented by the function U (K p ; K s ; ) in Section 3.7) in adat communities because deviations would have been met with strong resistance from the communities themselves. The non-adat communities, would have less reason to worry about investments in communications and transport (as the extent of mutual cooperation is lower to start with) and therefore, the central government would have been more successful in making such investments.
In the post-decentralisation period, community members have more say about how public funds are invested within the community. But it is important to note that while any opposition to the central government during the period of centralised …scal control would have been a collective community e¤ort, in a democratic setting community members vote individually and secretly. Individual community members may not take into account the possibility that certain investment choices will unravel cooperation in the future; or they may ignore the consequences of these investments because the process is too gradual to a¤ect their personal welfare. Thus, investment in communications and transport infrastructure may receive greater support in the post-decentralisation period, both in adat and non-adat communities. This may explain why, as previously noted, the e¤ect of decentralisation on public spending appears to be consistent with an increase in , as de…ned in (11) .
Indeed, consistent with this narrative, we observe (i) higher levels of physical infrastructure investment in the post-decentralisation period; (ii) lack of variation in physical infrastructure investment across adat and non-adat communities in the post-decentralisation period; (iii) greater investment in physical infrastructure, as well as higher levels of physical infrastructure in 'non-elite'communities -in which community members vote individually for leaders and policies -than in 'elite'communities in the post-decentralisation period.
Robustness Checks
It is possible to argue that …scal decentralisation induced changes in both formal and informal institutions in our sample and, as such, these variables are potentially endogenous. To address this issue, we examine the robustness of our results by considering communities with stable institutions: (i) communities where there was no change in local polity (i.e. those with stable polity) and (ii) communities which saw no change in terms of their adherence to adat laws over the decade (i.e., those with stable adat). These two sets of results are shown in Appendix Tables A2 and A3 respectively.
The results are essentially similar to what we found earlier. As before, when the share of investments in physical infrastructure is the dependent variable, the coe¢ cient of the central government grant share is negative and signi…cant. Therefore, as the central government's share in the community budget increases, spending on physical infrastructure goes down. Given the signs of the coe¢ cients on the interaction terms, this negative e¤ect is stronger for adat communities but more muted for 'elite' communities (both are statistically signi…cant). This result holds for both types of communities -those with stable polity and those with stable adherence to adat over the decade.
The e¤ect is slightly di¤erent for these two types of communities when we consider the share of social infrastructural spending: the coe¢ cient of the central government's share in the community budget is positive and statistically signi…cant (at the 10% level) for communities with stable adat and the e¤ect is statistically insigni…cant for communities with stable polity. The interaction terms are insigni…cant in all cases except one: there is an additional negative e¤ect of an increase in the share of central grant on 'elite'communities, signi…cant at the 10% level. Broadly, these estimates are in line with those obtained for the full sample, as shown in Table 6 .
Concluding Comments
Improving the quality of public services available to the poor is, potentially, an important tool for poverty alleviation in developing countries; and the potential role of …scal decentralisation in this process has been discussed extensively in the literature (World Bank 2004a). Since decentralisation provides greater decisionmaking power to local governments, its impact on public goods provision should, arguably, depend on the quality and nature of local institutions.
With this motivation, this paper investigated the impact of …scal decentralisation on local public spending in Indonesia using two rounds of the Indonesian Family Life Survey. Speci…cally, we explored how the share of public spending on goods which facilitate communication and exchange with outsiders (collectively called 'physical infrastructure') and health and education (collectively called 'social infrastructure') vary across communities which di¤er in terms of their adherence to customary law and practice of local democracy.
We found that the period of centralised …scal control was characterised by signi…cant heterogeneity across communities and that this heterogeneity disappeared following decentralisation.
Broadly, these …ndings indicate that the central government pursued di¤erent policies on public spending across communities depending on the nature of local institutions. But when decision-making power regarding public spending was transferred to the communities, they opted for similar policies, at least as measured by the share of spending on 'physical infrastructure'and 'social infrastructure'.
Decisions regarding local public spending, when in the hands of the central government, can, potentially, be shaped by political factors and strategies at the national level and the political science literature indicates that this was true in the case of the Soeharto regime in Indonesia, as discussed in Section 2. Our …ndings on heterogeneity of spending across communities prior to decentralisation provide support to this view.
However, the question as to whether or not the allocation of public spending following decentralisation was more e¢ cient requires a more nuanced answer. We suggest the possibility that, during the period of centralised …scal control, community leaders were able to bargain more e¤ectively with the central government and push for policies that would maximise community welfare, and that this became more di¢ cult following decentralisation when community members were, at least in some instances, able to vote, secretly and individually, for policies of their choice while ignoring negative externalities on other community members.
Such a narrative may explain why traditional adat communities spent a smaller share of development funds on physical infrastructure compared to non-adat communities -in line with the social optimum derived in our theoretical model -during the period of centralised …scal control but not after …scal decentralisation had been implemented.
Appendix
Proof. of Lemma 1: Di¤erentiating throughout (8) with respect to , we obtain
By assumption, 1 2 (T ) ^ c > 0. Therefore, using (16), we have
Di¤erentiating throughout (8) with respect to , we obtain
Let us denote by K ( ) the solution to (17 
